INVESTIGATING THE STOCHASTIC RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN OWNERSHIP AND FIRM FINANCIAL PERFORMANCE: AN EVIDENCE FROM LISTED PSX (PAKISTAN STOCK EXCHANGE) SUGAR COMPANIES OF PAKISTAN

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Volume 14 Issue 1 2018

Author(s):

Muhammad Asif Joyo
Lecturer at ILMA University, Karachi, Pakistan.
asif.joyo@gmail.com

Waqas Mahmood
Joint Director of ISD Department, State Bank of Pakistan, Karachi, Pakistan.
dr_waqas_mahmood@outlook.com

Wajahutallh Khan
Lecturer at ILMA University, Karachi, Pakistan.
registrar@ilmauniversity.edu.pk

Abstract The objective of the study is to investigate the stochastic relationship between ownership and firm financial performance. To achieve an objective, the panel data for 9 years have been collected of the top 10 sugar-producing companies listed on Pakistan Stock Exchange (PSX). The data extracted from annual financial statements and reports of sugar companies. A total of 90 observations have been taken to conduct this study after total panel observations were adjusted. In addition, some companies have been excluded based on the non-availability of data to ensure the sufficiency of data. Total seven variables have been applied in this study, four independent variables (i.e. Board Size, Board Independent Directors, Board Audit Committee, and Owners Equity) and three dependent variables (i.e. Return on Assets (ROA), Return on Equity (ROE), and Earnings Per Share (EPS)). The study concluded and explained the significance of ownership with the financial position and it showed that the sugar industry has a good financial performance based on results. In addition, corporate governance is considered one of the extensively studied subjects and helps in mitigating the divergence of interests among managers and investors. Board size shows a negative association with return on assets as Board sizes decrease return on assets increases and vice versa. Furthermore, the independent director & audit committee have a positive relationship with the earning per share.
Keywords Board Size, Corporate governance, Financial Performance, Independent Directors
Year 2018
Volume 14
Issue 1
Type Short Report
Recognized by Higher Education Commission of Pakistan, HEC
Category "Y"
Journal Name IBT Journal of Business Studies
Publisher Name ILMA University
Jel Classification D21, D22, G32, L21, M20
DOI http://dx.doi.org/10.46745/ilma.jbs.2018.14.01.06
ISSN no (E, Electronic) 2409-6520
ISSN no (P, Print) 2416-8393
Country Pakistan
City Karachi
Institution Type University
Journal Type Open Access
Manuscript Processing Blind Peer Reviewed
Format PDF
Paper Link http://ibtjbs.ilmauniversity.edu.pk/journal/jbs/14.1/6.pdf
Page 69-80
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